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∆ Low weight births
∆ SC QALYs
∆ NHS costs
†Quality of life, mortality and NHS costs dependent on Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD); SC QALYs measured for 
proportion of population receiving care
Cost and impact of 
strategy on 
pollutant by LSOA
Impact of strategy 




*For each LSOA population, assuming baseline event rate from MSOA and capturing full impact of lower exposure (no time 
lag); asthma restricted to those aged<19 during year of policy implementation
Impact of strategy on 
QALYs, SC QALYs, NHS 
costs and LA costs†
Intervention cost
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EDE = equally distributed equivalent; QALYS = quality adjusted life years







































































































































Title: Distributional cost effectiveness analysis of West Yorkshire low emission zone policies
Abstract: Alternative strategies can reduce road vehicle emissions, with differential effects on 
exposure across population groups.  We compare alternative strategies in West Yorkshire using a 
framework for economic evaluation that considers multiple perspectives and that takes account of 
the distribution of health outcomes.  
Exposure to pollutants by area is converted, via dose response relationships, into disease averted.  
Health benefits and NHS costs from diseases are estimated conditional on population demographics 
and index of multiple deprivation.  The net health benefits from alternative strategies are expressed 
as distributions of quality-adjusted life expectancy (QALE), which are compared using dominance 
criteria and societal aversion to health inequality.  Net production is estimated from intervention 
costs and the effects of health improvement on production and consumption.  Social care outcomes 
are estimated from health improvement among care recipients and changes in care expenditure. 
A switch to less polluting private vehicles is dominant in terms of the distribution of QALE and social 
care outcomes, but not consumption.  Inclusion of health inequality aversion alters the rank order 
compared to prioritisation on health maximisation. The results were sensitive to the magnitude of 
health opportunity costs, the level of inequality aversion and the proportion of intervention cost that 
generates health opportunity cost.
Key words: Economic evaluation, health inequalities, decision analysis, air pollution


































































Disadvantaged groups are often subject to greater exposure to air pollution, and are more 
susceptible to ill health effects from exposure.(Deguen et al., 2010)  A range of different 
interventions can improve air quality, which may have differential effects on the level of exposure 
across population groups.  The range of policies differ in their cost implications, and who bears the 
opportunity costs will have important implications for conclusions about overall benefit and net 
health inequality impact.  Few studies have evaluated the health inequality impacts of air quality 
strategies, and inconsistent results indicate that beneficial effects cannot be presumed.(Wang et al., 
2016)
The West Yorkshire Zone was identified as having the fourth most significant NO2 concentration 
issues in the UK, with exposure concentrated in deprived inner-city areas.  Exposure to atmospheric 
particles smaller than 2.5μm (PM2.5) was estimated to be responsible for 1 in 20 deaths in the area, 
and a health impact assessment showed that efforts to reduce this mortality would produce the 
largest benefits in the most deprived areas.(Cooper et al., 2015)  A previous study developed a 
model to show how cost effectiveness analysis from a health service perspective can be used to 
evaluate interventions to reduce transport emissions.(Lomas et al., 2016)  However, the cost-
effectiveness of low emission zones was deemed uncertain in recent National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE) guidance.(National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2017)  The 
cost benefit economic analysis undertaken for NICE used a "damage cost" method that applied a 
consumption value to convert direct health benefits (damages avoided) into monetary values to 
produce a benefit-cost ratio, but did not consider the health opportunity cost associated with 
healthcare resources.(Watkiss et al., 2006)  These previous economic evaluations considered a single 
strategy to reduce road vehicle emissions, and did not estimate the size or value of health inequality 
impacts.  
This study updates and extends the previous cost effectiveness analysis to compare multiple 
strategies for reducing road vehicle emissions in terms of the impact on the distribution of health 
and to consider the implications of who bears the opportunity cost of the alternative schemes.  In 
consideration of the distribution of the opportunity cost, we also present impacts on non-health 
outcomes related to consumption and local authority expenditure, but we do not attempt to 
combine these with health outcomes.  Instead, we show how evaluation of health inequality impact 
and other considerations may influence the prioritisation of different strategies.  
2. Methods
We apply a framework for economic evaluation to inform multiple decision makers, and consider the 
viewpoint of three stakeholders: the healthcare sector, local authorities, and individual 
citizens.(Walker et al., 2019)  We assume that the healthcare sector is concerned with improvement 
of health outcomes in terms of increasing population health and reducing health inequalities.  The 
UK Health and Social Care Act 2012 requires that resource allocation decisions in healthcare are 
made with due regard to the reduction of inequality in health outcomes associated with 
socioeconomic factors.  We therefore assume that, at the societal level, health inequality associated 
with socioeconomic factors is regarded as unfair, and that reduction of this inequality would 
improve societal welfare.  

































































Local authorities in the UK are responsible for public services relating to social care, transport 
planning and highways, public health, housing, planning, leisure and environment, and for 
monitoring air quality in their areas.  When evaluating changes in air quality we assume that their 
concern is for improving health and social care outcomes and the local economy.  We consider 
impacts on individuals in terms of health related quality of life, social care related quality of life, life 
expectancy, and production and consumption of good and services.
We therefore have multiple stakeholders with an interest in health outcomes, and between whom 
we assume that the health opportunity cost associated with expenditure on strategies to reduce 
vehicle emissions could differ.  Where interventions use public sector funds and draw from specific 
budgets, the opportunity cost is in terms of a restricted set of other activities that could have been 
provided with the same set of resources.  That is, the set of relevant alternatives and opportunities is 
constrained by institutional context.  Monetary willingness to pay and willingness to accept values 
elicited from individuals denote the opportunity cost of alternative uses of private income, and are 
inappropriate for valuing opportunity cost in relation to specific budgets.(Drummond et al., 2015)  
For example, the opportunity cost of NHS resources is not determined by free choice of alternative 
investments.  Investment in building a car factory or upgrading train stock would not be options to 
fund from NHS resources.  Instead, the opportunity cost is in terms of alternative investments that 
fall within the remit of the NHS.  Correspondingly, when a particular budget is already fully spent, 
any investment that imposes costs on that budget necessitates disinvestment from other activities 
supported by that budget.  The relevant stakeholders also have multiple objectives (health, social 
care, production and consumption), and the valuations they attach to these different objectives are 
not explicit.
2.1 Direct health impacts of each strategy
Strategies to reduce road vehicle emissions include efforts to upgrade vehicle stock to produce 
lower emissions through better technology and by moving away from diesel as a fuel source.  The 
health impact assessment to inform the feasibility of a West Yorkshire Low Emission Zone provided 
lower layer super output area (LSOA) level information on the expected change in exposure to 
pollutants (NO2, PM2.5, PM10) for 17 alternative transport emission reduction strategies (shown in 
Table 1).  LSOAs are geographic areas with an average population size of 1,500 individuals used by 
the Office for National Statistics in the UK for many of its statistical outputs.  They can be mapped to 
local healthcare funders (clinical commissioning groups), local authority districts and area based 
measures of socioeconomic deprivation.
Local area health profile data produced by Public Health England provided the baseline levels of 
pollution-linked disease in each middle layer super output area (MSOA) in the period 2010-2014, 
which comprise coronary heart disease, chronic bronchitis, asthma, low weight births, preterm 
births and all-cause mortality.  Each LSOA within an MSOA was assigned the same baseline rate of 
events.  Dose response functions from meta-analyses and studies recommended by COEMAP link 
change in pollution exposure in each area to change in incidence of pollution-linked 
disease.(Cesaroni et al., 2014; Colbourn et al., 2007; Department of Health Medical Directorate 
Respiratory Team, 2010; Favarato et al., 2014; Hoek et al., 2013; Mangham et al., 2009; Pedersen et 
al., 2013; Sapkota et al., 2012; Schikowski et al., 2014; World Health Organisation, 2013)  These 

































































determine the absolute number of cases averted for each LSOA, according to the size and age 
structure of the population in each local authority reported in the 2011 ONS census1.  
We combine this with a set of Markov models for each pollution linked disease that estimate the 
health benefits and NHS cost from each case averted based on external data on mortality, health-
related quality of life and NHS costs conditional on  the index of multiple deprivation (IMD).(Asaria et 
al., 2016; Kind et al., 1999; Love-Koh et al., 2015; Office for National Statistics, 2017)  The index of 
multiple deprivation is a measure that ranks the deprivation level of an area based on the proportion 
of people in that area who experience deprivation in the domains of income, employment, health, 
education, access to services, living environment, housing and crime.(Noble et al., 2006)  For the 
purposes of our analysis, it allows us to describe inequality in outcomes by area level deprivation (a 
bivariate measure of health inequality by IMD), and, through the link between IMD and healthy life 
expectancy, to describe inequality in outcomes by differences in baseline level of health (a univariate 
measure of health inequality).  Table A1 in the appendix summarises the data sources and 
assumptions used across the combined models, which estimate the health benefits of cases averted 
in terms of quality adjusted life years (QALYs) and NHS costs over a lifetime horizon.  Figure 1 
provides a summary of the modelled relationships.
We incorporate information on the baseline distribution of healthy life expectancy in the UK so that 
we can express outcomes in terms of both the change in health and the absolute level of 
health.(Love-Koh et al., 2015)  We characterise different susceptibility to air pollution in terms of 
area baseline incidence of pollution related disease, which confers a differential absolute harm from 
a given level of pollutant by area.  We also characterise different capacity to benefit in terms of 
competing impacts on mortality and quality of life by socioeconomic status.  In the absence of 
evidence that socioeconomic status modifies the relative effect of air pollution, we use the same 
dose response relationship for given pollutants across population groups.(Laurent et al., 2007) 
2.2 Direct non-health impacts
Previous work to estimate the wider societal benefits of health interventions has estimated the link 
from health status to productivity and consumption, including both formal and informal (unpaid) 
activities, and including social care.(Roberts, 2015)  This allows us to link improvements in health 
related quality of life to increased production and decreased consumption by age and sex, and show 
how additional quality adjusted survival has different impacts on production net of consumption 
according to the beneficiary’s age and sex.  Health related quality of life varies by IMD within our 
model, and this introduces additional socioeconomic variation in the wider societal benefits over 
and above that caused by the differential health impacts by IMD and the differential wider societal 
benefits by age and sex.  For non-health outcomes, we consider only the total change attributed to 
each strategy and do not estimate the distribution or the absolute level.
A UK population study estimated an ‘exchange rate’ between health related quality of life (as 
measured by EQ-5D) and social care related quality of life (ASCOT).  It provides an equation to 
predict ASCOT from EQ-5D, and vice versa (EQ-5D-3L = −0.04883 + 0.978042*ASCOT). (Stevens et al., 
2018)  We use this within the Markov models to convert health-related quality of life into social care 
1 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census/key-statistics-for-local-authorities-in-englandand-
wales/rft-table-ks102ew.xls

































































related quality of life to estimate the impact of strategies on a preference based measure of social 
care needs and wants (social care QALY).  
We assume that additional consumption represents a direct benefit to individuals separate to the 
benefit derived from health outcomes (i.e. consumption value is not included in the QALY).  We 
assume that changes in individuals’ consumption not matched by changes in production impose a 
direct cost (for excess consumption) or direct benefit (for excess production) to other individuals, in 
terms of impact on their consumption.  For any changes in expenditure on formal social care 
activities, we assume that 45% is local authority funded, with the remaining paid privately or 
supported by other means (e.g. the third sector).
2.3 Opportunity costs
Although the intervention costs are not borne by the NHS, the strategies alter the amount of NHS 
expenditure on air pollution related health events.  The health opportunity cost of NHS expenditure 
is based on an estimate of the marginal productivity of the health sector and how a marginal QALY 
produced by the NHS is distributed by IMD.(Claxton et al., 2015; Love-Koh et al., in submission)  This 
showed that the most deprived tenth of the population derive almost twice the benefit of NHS 
expenditure compared to the least deprived tenth.  In the absence of evidence on the marginal 
productivity of local authority public health funds, the health opportunity cost of local authority 
public health spend is assumed to be in line with that of NHS expenditure.  These opportunity costs 
allow us to convert changes in total NHS resource use and local authority public health expenditure 
for each strategy into health opportunity costs, which are summed with the direct health benefits 
from reduced exposure to air pollution.  As for the direct non-health benefits, the health opportunity 
costs are converted into corresponding changes in individuals’ production and consumption.  We 
estimate the change in social care outcomes that accompany these health opportunity costs by 
again applying exchange rate between EQ-5D and ASCOT.
The cost of the intervention falls to the local authority for strategies that improve the bus stock, and 
to individuals for strategies that seek to encourage the switch to lower emission private and freight 
vehicles.  The majority of local authority spend in the UK is on social care (59% across adult and 
children social care) with smaller proportions spent on public health (8%), and highways and 
transport (5%).(National Audit Office, 2017)  Thus, money spent on transport policies by a local 
authority may displace public health activities, but will also generate opportunity costs on other 
outcomes additional to health.  We assume that 8% of local authority funds spent on improving the 
bus stock would otherwise have been spent on public health interventions and hence generate 
health opportunity costs.  We assume that 59% of the money would otherwise have been spent on 
formal care and produce opportunity costs in terms of social care related quality of life.  The 
remaining 33% is assumed to produce opportunity costs in other local authority produced goods and 
services measured in terms of expenditure.  This assumption that opportunity costs fall in proportion 
to average expenditure in each category may be unrealistic, and we test alternative assumptions in 
sensitivity analysis.
The social care opportunity cost of formal care expenditure is based on an estimate of the marginal 
productivity of the social care sector.(Forder et al., 2014)  The distribution of this opportunity cost is 
unavailable, and so we use the value of one social care QALY per £50,000 to calculate the total 
opportunity cost.  

































































We describe the opportunity costs borne by individuals in terms of consumption.  These include the 
financial cost of strategies to improve private vehicles and the financial cost of strategies to improve 
freight vehicles.  Regulations to improve private vehicles and freight vehicles force individuals to 
increase their consumption in that domain.  We do not estimate health opportunity costs from 
consumption impacts.  
2.4 Health inequality impacts
The results are expressed in terms of the distribution of quality-adjusted life expectancy (QALE) 
under each strategy and without any intervention for the population covered by the West Yorkshire 
Low Emission Zone.  The sum of quality-adjusted life expectancy across all 1.27 million residents of 
Leeds and Bradford (ONS census 2011) provides the total population health benefit under each 
strategy.  Inequality can be assessed with respect to individuals ranked by baseline health (a 
univariate distribution of health) or ranked by IMD decile (a bivariate distribution of health by area 
level disadvantage).  Leeds and Bradford is relatively disadvantaged compared to the UK, with 
340,953 (27%) residents living in areas ranked within the most deprived IMD decile, and only 
478,158 (38%) residing in areas ranked above the median IMD.  The alternative distributions of 
quality adjusted life expectancy are first compared using stochastic dominance to determine if the 
strategy that offers the greatest population health benefit can also be judged to offer the greatest 
reduction in health inequality.  First order stochastic dominance occurs if a strategy provides the 
greatest health for any individual (i.e. across the whole distribution).(Saposnik, 1981)  For example, if 
we line up the population in order (from lowest IMD to highest) and plot each members QALE for 
two alternative strategies, we would find first order stochastic dominance if the curves for each 
strategy never crossed.  Second order stochastic dominance can be found if, as quality adjusted life 
expectancy is summed across individuals ordered from worst off to the best off, the sum is always 
greater than that of any other strategy.(Shorrocks, 1983)  That is, if we line up the population in 
order and then plot the accumulated QALE as you move from lowest to highest IMD, we would find 
second order stochastic dominance if the curves for each strategy never crossed.  Second order 
dominance can exist when first order does not, but only for a strategy that offers the greatest health 
for the lowest ranked individual. 
Stochastic dominance produces only a partial ordering of strategies if any of the cumulative health 
distributions are observed to cross.  When a strategy improves mean population health but may 
increase some concept of health inequality, we must be more specific about the nature of the 
inequality aversion to determine a ranking.  By specifying the nature and the level of the inequality 
aversion, a normative value for inequality in a distribution of health can be determined.  We 
summarise the value of each strategy using equally distributed equivalent QALE derived from an 
Atkinson index.  The equally distributed equivalent increases with the total amount of health, and 
decreases as relative inequality in the distribution increases.  The Atkinson index describes the 
percentage by which the overall value is reduced by relative inequality in a distribution.(Atkinson, 
1970)  The inequality aversion parameter (ε=10.95) required to estimate the value loss from 
inequality in the distribution of health is taken from a UK general population survey that estimated 
the amount of population health respondents would be willing to forgo to reduce health inequality 
between poor and rich individuals.(Robson et al., 2017)  Comparing how an intervention alters 
equally distributed equivalent QALE to how it alters overall QALE (the unweighted health benefit) 
lets us describe the value of the health inequality impact in terms of health outcomes (QALYs).  For 

































































example, if an intervention increases equally distributed equivalent QALE by more than it increases 
QALE, the difference is attributable to a reduction in health inequality.
We explore whether the rank order of the strategies differs in terms of total population health 
benefit versus equally distributed equivalent health benefit to determine whether concern for 
relative health inequality by IMD might alter the preferred strategy for introducing a low emission 
zone.  
2.5 Sensitivity analysis
Probabilistic sensitivity analysis is used to determine the impact of parameter uncertainty on the 
results.  The distributions assigned to model parameters are described in Table A1.  The 3,000 Monte 
Carlo simulations drawn for the probabilistic analysis are used to calculate the error probability, 
which is the probability that a strategy other than the one selected using current evidence satisfies 
the given objective (for example maximising population health).  The error probability should be 
interpreted in light of the number of strategies; for a random (uninformed) choice, the error 
probability is higher with 18 strategies (94%), than with two (50%).  The cost of parameter 
uncertainty is the difference between the expected outcomes based on current evidence and the 
expected outcomes possible with perfect information, and this can be reported in terms of QALYs or 
equivalent health sector funding (based on the marginal productivity of the NHS).  The cost of 
parameter uncertainty represents the maximum possible value of further efforts to generate 
evidence to inform the parameters for the current decision problem.
Local authorities may seek a grant from the Department of Transport to implement a low emission 
zone.  In this case, the opportunity cost of the intervention cost is in terms of broader Government 
expenditure and not local authority public health or social care expenditure.  Alternatively, we may 
assume that all local authority expenditure would otherwise have been spent on public health 
interventions, and generate health opportunity costs.
The opportunity cost applied in the analysis determines both the level of health benefit and the level 
of the health inequality impact.  Uncertainty in the marginal productivity of health resources is 
incorporated in the probabilistic sensitivity analysis.  However, we also conduct one way sensitivity 
analysis to illustrate how the results vary to alternative mean values for the health opportunity cost 
(between one QALY per £10,000 and one QALY per £20,000).
Where a strategy is found to have stochastic dominance over others, the rank order will not change 
for different values of inequality aversion.  In the absence of stochastic dominance we conduct 
threshold sensitivity analysis on the value of the inequality aversion parameter (between 0 and 16).
3. Results 
The model predicts health to be monotonically increasing with IMD for all strategies, such that 
ranking the population in terms of decile of IMD produces the same order as ranking those groups 
by QALE conditional on IMD.  All strategies improved QALE compared to no intervention in all IMD 
deciles.  Table A2 in the appendix shows the population QALE by IMD decile and the population size 
in each decile, the total population QALE and the equally distributed equivalent QALE, for each 
strategy.  It can be seen from Figure 2 that strategy 11 (return petrol:diesel fuel split to Year 2000 
levels within 7 years) has first order stochastic dominance over all other strategies.  It produces the 

































































superior distribution of health by providing both most health overall and the most health within 
each IMD decile.  Correspondingly, it is associated with the highest equally distributed equivalent 
QALE, and this would not alter regardless of the inequality aversion parameter applied.  A dominant 
strategy in terms of providing the best result across all outcomes when impacts on overall health 
and health inequality are jointly considered is evident in Figure 3, the health equity impact plane; 
moving to strategy 11 from the origin (no intervention) or any other strategy entails moving up and 
to the right, increasing both population health and the societal welfare from reduction in health 
inequality.  
3.1 Impact of health inequality on prioritisation
Comparing the remaining strategies in Table 2, the rank order changes with incorporation of health 
inequality concerns for strategies 13 and 14.  Moving from strategy 13 to strategy 14 on the health 
equity impact plane entails moving down (less population health) and to the right (greater societal 
welfare from reduction in health inequality).  If judged on total population health alone, strategy 13 
(upgrade HGV stock to Euro VI standards by 2021) which provides an additional 1088 QALYs 
compared to no intervention, would be preferred to strategy 14 (all bus and HGV Euro VI by 2021), 
which provides a net gain of 1084 QALYs compared to no intervention.  However, strategy 14 
reduces health inequality by a greater degree than strategy 13, providing 1197 EDE QALYs compared 
to no intervention as opposed to the 1189 provided under strategy 13.  As can be seen from Figure 
2, strategy 14 provides greater health gain in IMD decile 1 (most deprived) and IMD decile 3 
compared to strategy 13.
3.2 Alternative perspectives
Table 2 also indicates how the rank order of the strategies alters for different perspectives.  Strategy 
11 is ranked first in terms of net impact on social care quality adjusted life years, but only two 
strategies maintain the same rank as they would using a health perspective.  Strategy 11 cannot be 
regarded as dominant if the perspective includes impacts on production and consumption because it 
no longer provides the greatest improvement in all outcomes.  Strategy 6 increases net production 
by £10,779,566 more than strategy 11, but provides 638 fewer QALYs and 688 fewer equally 
distribution equivalent QALYs.  If the consumption value of an additional year in full health is at least 
£16,895 (i.e. if it would be considered appropriate to trade at least £16,895 of consumption for one 
QALY), strategy 11 would be preferred over strategy 6.
3.3 Sensitivity analyses
Based on the results from the probabilistic sensitivity analysis,  Strategy 11 is the most likely to 
provide the maximum health and the maximum equally distributed equivalent health, but for both 
the error probability is 75%.  Of the remaining strategies, no intervention and strategies 2-9 have 
<1% probability of providing the maximum health or equally distributed equivalent health, while 
strategies 10 and 12-17 have between 8% and 13% chance of maximising health or equally 
distributed equivalent health.  The cost of parameter uncertainty is similar whether the choice of 
strategy is aimed at maximising health (452 QALYs or £5,847,490 in health sector funding) or 
maximising equally distributed equivalent health (486 QALYs or £6,288,161 in health sector funding).
All strategies maintain stochastic dominance over no intervention when health opportunity costs are 
varied between £10,000 and £20,000.  As seen in Figure 4, the ranking of strategies 2, 3, 12, 16 and 
17 is sensitive to variation in the health opportunity cost.  The ranking of strategies 12, 13, 14 and 17 

































































is sensitive to variation in the inequality aversion parameter.  Strategy 11 is the preferred strategy 
for all combinations of health opportunity cost and inequality aversion parameter.  
The base case assumes that 8% of local authority expenditure would otherwise have been spent on 
public health interventions.  Table 3 shows the results for alternative assumptions (0% and 100%).  
Strategy 11, which is not funded through local authority expenditure, maintains stochastic 
dominance over the alternatives, but health distributions for the remaining strategies that are 
funded by the local authority are affected.  The greater the percentage of local authority funds that 
would otherwise have been spent on public health interventions, the lower are the net gains in 
population QALE.  If 100% of the local authority funds required to implement strategies would 
otherwise have been invested in public health interventions, strategies 3 and 5, which impose the 
greatest cost burden on local authorities, are found to have a negative net health impact compared 
to no intervention.  Increasing the percentage of local authority funds that generate health 
opportunity costs also increases the impact of health inequality concerns on the ranking.  With 0% of 
local authority funds incurring health opportunity costs inclusion of health inequality affects the rank 
order of strategies 4 and 9, but at 100% the rank order affected for strategies 2, 7, 9, 12 and 14.
4. Discussion 
This is the first economic evaluation of strategies to lower road vehicle emissions to take account of 
health inequality impacts and inform the prioritisation across multiple alternative strategies.  
Evidence on the impact of each strategy on pollutants at LSOA level allowed us to link changes in 
health to IMD.  The availability of evidence to link pollutants to health events and to vary the health 
outcomes and opportunity costs according to IMD allowed us to translate change in pollutant levels 
to a change in the distribution of health.  The impact of strategies to tackle air pollution goes beyond 
the health sector, but previous attempts at adopting a ‘societal perspective’ have failed to expose 
fully the consequences for each relevant stakeholder.  Our approach represents an improvement by 
reflecting health and non health outcomes both in terms of direct impacts and opportunity costs.
In comparing the distribution of health generated by each strategy and by no intervention, we were 
able to rank the strategies to inform decisions about which would be preferred to implement a low 
emission zone given the focus on health.  Stochastic dominance identified a preferred strategy 
considering impacts on the distribution of health without the need to specify the type and level of 
societal aversion to health inequalities.  However, stochastic dominance did not provide a complete 
ranking of strategies, for which it was necessary to summarise and value health inequality impacts 
relative to changes in overall population health.  We showed how the Atkinson index and equally 
distributed equivalent health provide a full ranking when stochastic dominance does not.  However, 
the level of inequality aversion is uncertain, and can be difficult to measure without bias.(Cookson et 
al., 2018)  This leads to uncertainty in conclusions about the ranking of strategies that increase 
population health but increase inequality relative to another, or that reduce inequality and produce 
less population health compared to another. We have shown how sensitivity analysis can elucidate 
this uncertainty.
While the main focus of this paper is on the distribution of health, this may not be the sole or 
primary concern for decision makers responsible for implementing a low emission zone.  We 
considered wider societal benefits associated with changes in health in terms of production, 
consumption and social care outcomes.  Estimating both local authority costs and direct benefits 
from formal social care provides information for decision makers interested in social care related 

































































quality of life.  Local authorities are also responsible for public health, and so consider health 
outcomes alongside social care related quality of life, but the relative value local authorities place on 
these outcomes is unknown.  In our case study, the optimal strategy does not alter regardless the 
relative values of health and social care outcomes, but a set rank order for all strategies would 
require an explicit trade-off.  Consumption impacts are important to demonstrate the implications of 
shifting cost from the public sector to private individuals.  Consideration of net production invites 
consideration of how much increased consumption is valued relative to improvements in health.  In 
our analysis the threshold was a consumption value of at least £16,895 per QALY in order to prefer 
strategy 11 over strategy 6 on the basis of impacts on health and production, which is below the 
value of £60,000 per QALY suggested by the Department of Health.(Glover et al., 2010)
Even with a health focus, the conclusions about net population health benefit depend on whether 
resources used to fund the low emission zone would otherwise have been spent on health 
generating activities, and the size of the health opportunity cost associated with those funds.  While 
there is currently evidence on the distribution of the health opportunity cost of NHS resources, we 
relied on the assumption that the health opportunity cost of local authority expenditure is the same 
as for the NHS.  Given the role of local authorities in improving public health, improving knowledge 
of this opportunity cost is important.
The underlying model we use to demonstrate the evaluation of air pollution policies for multiple 
perspectives and different concerns about health inequality brings together a diverse evidence base 
to estimate multiple outcomes, but is relatively simple and static.  Increasing the complexity of the 
model, for example to reflect the time lag between exposure and outcome or the behavioural 
impacts of policies, might produce more accurate results.  Nevertheless, the framework we present 
here for analysing and presenting those results would still apply. There is also a lack of evidence to 
inform the distribution of the non-health outcomes and the weight society may place on reducing 
inequality.  Publicly funded social care in the UK has a larger pro-poor bias compared to health care 
expenditure (3.9 ratio of benefits in kind received by bottom fifth of the income distribution relative 
to the top fifth, versus 1.8 ratio for health care).(Sefton, 2002)  Potentially, the burden of 
opportunity costs from local authority formal care expenditure is borne more heavily by the most 
deprived compared to health care.  
A societal perspective for economic evaluation is often advocated to capture effects across multiple 
domains.  This is challenging to implement in the absence of an explicit social welfare function, and 
eliciting an agreed stated societal value of health relative to other outcomes is unlikely to be 
feasible.(Arrow, 1963; Walker et al., 2019)  The simple summation of private costs with healthcare 
costs and local authority costs would be inappropriate given the potentially different opportunity 
costs of specific budgets.  Even if it were possible, a single summary societal perspective result is 
unlikely to inform multiple heterogeneous stakeholders that may have different values for different 
outcomes.
Previously the cost effectiveness of low emission zones was considered uncertain by NICE.  In our 
analysis the optimal approach to introducing a low emission zone is uncertain, but it is not uncertain 
that outcomes will improve compared to no intervention.  For decision makers that value reduction 
of health inequality alongside increases population health, quantifying health inequality impacts as 
we have done here may strengthen the assessment of value for money.
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Table 1. List of strategies and estimated costs
Strategy name and number Strategy details
Total cost 
(£million)
Location intervention cost burden
1. Fuel split by 2016 Return petrol:diesel fuel split to Year 2000 levels within 2 years £103.1 Private vehicle owners
2. Euro II and Euro III bus retrofit by 2016 Retrofit Euro II and Euro III buses within 2 years £3.4 Local authority
3. All buses Euro VI by 2016 Upgrade bus stock to meet Euro VI standards within 2 years £34.7 Local authority
4. All HGV Euro VI by 2016 Upgrade HGV stock to meet Euro VI standards within 2 years £54 General population
5. All bus and HGV Euro VI by 2016 Upgrade bus and HGV stock to meet Euro VI standards within 2 years £88.7 Local authority and general population
6. All vans Euro VI by 2016 Upgrade all private vans to Euro VI with 2 years £187 Private vehicle owners
7. Pre Euro IV bus to Euro VI by 2016 Upgrade pre Euro IV buses to meet Euro VI standards within 2 years £3.9 Local authority
8. Pre Euro IV HGV to Euro VI by 2016 Upgrade pre Euro IV HGVs to meet Euro VI standards within 2 years £2.4 General population
9. Pre Euro IV bus and HGV to Euro VI by 2016 Upgrade pre Euro IV buses and HGVs to meet Euro VI standards within 2 years £6.3 Local authority and general population
10. Pre Euro V buses and HGVs to Euro VI by 2021 Upgrade pre Euro V buses and HGVs to meet Euro VI standards within 7 years £4.2 Local authority and general population
11. Fuel split by 2021 Return petrol:diesel fuel split to Year 2000 levels within 7 years £110.6 Private vehicle owners
12. All buses Euro VI by 2021 Upgrade bus stock to meet Euro VI standards within 7 years £10.8 Local authority
13. All HGV Euro VI by 2021 Upgrade HGV stock to meet Euro VI standards within 7 years £8.8 General population
14. All bus and HGV Euro VI by 2021 Upgrade bus and HGV stock to meet Euro VI standards within 7 years £19.6 Local authority and general population
15. All vans Euro VI by 2021 Upgrade all private vans to Euro VI with 7 years £61 Private vehicle owners
16. Pre Euro V buses to Euro VI by 2021 Upgrade pre Euro V bus stock to meet Euro VI standards within 7 years £2.7 Local authority
17. Pre Euro V HGV to Euro VI by 2021 Upgrade pre Euro V HGV stock to meet Euro VI standards within 7 years £1.5 General population



















































Table 2. Rank order of strategies according to different model outputs
Health outcomes Non health outcomes
Change in QALYs compared 
to no intervention
Change in EDE compared 
to no intervention
Social care Production less consumption
Strategy QALYs Rank EDE QALYs Rank LA expenditure
Social care 
QALYs†
Rank by social 
care QALYs
Net production‡ Rank
1 900 9 984 9 -£102,159 11 5 £7,425,759 4
2 538 16 595 16 -£47,664 4 11 £969,681 17
3 474 17 561 17 -£67,536 -33 17 £1,028,952 16
4 624 12 680 12 -£61,650 8 9 £6,664,052 6
5 651 10 753 10 -£99,129 -31 16 £7,077,241 5
6 640 11 703 11 -£59,221 8 8 £19,961,308 1
7 563 14 622 14 -£53,069 3 13 £1,071,713 15
8 559 15 613 15 -£48,182 8 10 £1,259,043 14
9 597 13 659 13 -£58,361 4 12 £1,420,422 13
10 1049 5 1150 5 -£130,662 9 6 £2,826,334 9
11 1278 1 1391 1 -£170,300 14 1 £9,181,722 2
12 1023 8 1130 8 -£133,998 0 15 £2,656,160 11
13 1087 2 1188 3 -£135,017 13 2 £3,679,144 8
14 1084 3 1196 2 -£145,008 0 14 £3,761,783 7
15 1058 4 1157 4 -£129,039 12 3 £8,780,689 3
16 1040 6 1140 6 -£128,975 9 7 £2,644,130 12
17 1036 7 1132 7 -£125,632 12 4 £2,754,903 10
QALY = quality adjusted life year; EDE = equally distributed equivalent; LA expenditure = local authority expenditure on formal care
†Social care QALYs includes local authority formal care expenditure converted into social care QALYs using the opportunity cost of social care funds(Forder et al., 2014)
‡Excludes local authority expenditure on formal care and Government expenditure on health



















































Table 3. Sensitivity analysis on opportunity cost of local authority intervention funds
Opportunity cost of LA funds all on Government 
expenditure (0% public health)
Opportunity cost of LA funds all on public health 
(100% public health)
Change in QALYs 
compared to no 
intervention
Change in EDE compared 
to no intervention
Change in QALYs 
compared to no 
intervention
Change in EDE 
compared to no 
intervention
Strategy QALYs Rank EDE QALYs Rank QALYs Rank EDE QALYs Rank
1 900 9 984 9 900 5 984 5
2 559 16 614 16 296 13 378 14
3 688 11 754 11 -1994 17 -1654 17
4 624 13 680 14 624 9 680 9
5 866 10 946 10 -1817 16 -1462 16
6 640 12 703 12 640 8 703 8
7 587 15 644 15 285 14 373 15
8 559 17 613 17 559 10 613 10
9 621 14 681 13 319 11 410 13
10 1066 5 1165 5 857 6 977 6
11 1278 1 1391 1 1278 1 1391 1
12 1090 3 1190 3 255 15 441 12
13 1087 4 1188 4 1087 2 1188 2
14 1151 2 1256 2 316 12 507 11
15 1058 6 1157 6 1058 3 1157 3
16 1057 7 1155 7 848 7 968 7
17 1036 8 1132 8 1036 4 1132 4
LA = local authority; QALY = quality adjusted life year; EDE = equally distributed equivalent
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